Nike's Satanic Factories in West Java (Indonesia)

Peter Hancock, Centre for Development Studies; Edith Cowan University; Western Australia.

"Mereka Pergi dan Pulang Seperti Hantu Dari Pabrik Setan":

In September 1996 I had been researching female factory workers in a rural area of West Java (Banjaran) for two months when the words of an old man (immediately above) were so tormenting that I had to investigate their meaning. I arrived in the old man's village at about 8.00 PM on a week night to survey factory workers. I entered on foot as the roads were so bad that no form of transport is available during the night time (in the rainy season). I asked the old man where I could find women who worked for Nike. He replied that they had not returned since leaving at 4.00 AM the previous morning. I was puzzled and he explained that all the factory workers worked for Feng Tay (Nike) and I had very little chance of seeing them, as their families rarely saw them. He said the women from Nike were called "Walking Ghosts Who Worked in Satan's Factory" (Mereka pergi dan pulang seperti hantu dari pabrik Setan) by the local community and if I wanted to speak with them I would have to become a ghost myself.

1997 will be a boom year for Nike. Profits are up, orders are going through the roof and Nike now dominates the sports shoe market internationally. In the second quarter of 1996 Nike's net income had already doubled from the previous year. Worldwide, Nike revenues in 1996 were up 55% from the previous year, over the US$2 billion mark. Orders for 1997 indicated another 50% increase in revenues to over US$4 billion for that year (NIKE 1,1996). Each year Nike commands an even greater share of the market, the result of a massive marketing campaign using key sports personalities from strategic areas (Michael Jordan). Nike has taken advantage of the globalisation of manufacturing whereby significantly cheaper wages are sought by multi-nationals in nations like Indonesia, with added bonuses that human rights issues are repressed by a military-backed political. Nike was born out of the great globalisation of manufacturing trend in the 1970s and has basically profited from exploiting the comparative advantage offered by poor nations, usually in Southeast Asia and mainland Asia.

Nike began full production in Indonesia in 1988 and by 1996 one third of its' shoes were produced there (CAA,1996). Globalisation of manufacturing since the 1970s has given rise to an international division of labour and in the shoe sector created a predominantly female workforce. However the promises of globalisation, such as Trickle Down, whereby macro economic development would benefit poor workers and their families through foreign investment in the third world, has not occurred to the extent predicted by economists. Nor has the promised widespread poverty alleviation of the masses occurred (Mehmet,1995:12). However, as this case study from Indonesia shows, Trickle Down is blocked by Nike's lack of concern, by the Indonesian state's greed and oppression and through the position from which the workers come, which is one of extreme disadvantage. Further, local factors such as culture and geography play a role in restricting so called Trickle Down benefits and are factors which need to be recognised in this regard in the future. The more profitable Nike becomes, the more power it has to influence national governments and inevitably other shoe manufacturers will follow its exploitative lead as is highlighted below with the example of the Kukje factory in Banjaran, West Java.

In 1994 Nike released this statement;

    As a player in Indonesia's economy, Nike is part of a plan that

    has succeeded in increasing per capita income ten-fold since

    1970 while decreasing those living in poverty from 60% to 15%

    in the same period..... by supporting light manufacturing Nike

    contributes to the increase of workers skills, wages and

    capabilities. (Nike,1994:2.3).

Nike has attempted to claim some credit in the improvement of the economic situation of Indonesia since the 1970s. However, Nike did not fully enter Indonesia until 1988. Nike has attempted to use Indonesian state statistics (which are themselves highly questionable) as a form of propaganda to silence its' many critics. Further, Nike's worker turnover rates in the factories researched are so short that few benefits, such as those mentioned above, are forthcoming. The average working life of Nike workers surveyed in Banjaran was less than half that of all workers from other factories surveyed, yet Nike claimed in 1993 that;

The overwhelming share of workers in our factories have had a positive experience, as evidenced by the fact that the turnover rate in those factories is the lowest in the business.... The workers if you will vote on their feet. (Kidd,1993).

Yes Nike workers in Banjaran do vote on their feet, they leave the factory more quickly than any other group of women from all other multi-nationals surveyed in Banjaran, extremely unhappy with conditions and resentful toward management (See P 7).

Whilst researching female factory workers in and around Banjaran, a small but rapidly industrialising region in West Java, I became acutely aware that one joint-venture international factory stood apart from the rest,- Nike. Banjaran has industrialised rapidly as foreign controlled factories clamber to take advantage of the abundant untapped human recourse's in the region, and at the same time can locate their factories more cheaply in Banjaran than they can probably anywhere else in the world with the full support of the state.

Of all the multi-national factories in Banjaran, which employ predominantly women (textiles, garments and shoes), the Nike factory rates the lowest in terms of treatment of workers via-a-vis overtime wages, working conditions, the non-payment of legal working benefits (Sick Leave, Menstruation Leave, Bonuses ECT) and staff turnover. Evidence to support the 'lowest rating' is provided by the analyses of quantitative and qualitative data from interviews and focus groups; data which can be best described as 'community perceptions'. Further supporting evidence comes from information received from key informants about another large shoe factory in the region. At the time of my research the factory next door to Nike, Kukje, a Korean shoe factory had just been granted a Nike contract and the impact of Nike production processes upon the lives of the women workers was sudden and negative, as will be highlighted below.

The Indonesian economy, on the surface at least, shows all the signs of a successfully developing country reliant on foreign investment and export-oriented industrial development. Economic growth has averaged over 7% per annum in the 1990s, the manufacturing sector has overtaken agriculture in terms of value to GDP and per capita GNP has steadily increased over the last decade. Education and health services show signs of improvement and illiteracy and poverty rates have dramatically fallen since the mid-1980s, according to officially released data. However, in 1996 Indonesia was still a poor nation with an average GNP per capita income of $US 880.00.

In 1995 foreign investment in export oriented manufacturing industries reached unprecedented levels in Indonesia. In the first six months of that year foreign investment approvals increased by almost 200% from the previous year. This was mainly due to over 200 existing laws on investment and financial regulation being either loosened or completely changed to attract foreign investors. This combined with Indonesia's very cheap labour, weak unions and abundant population attracted investors in significant numbers. Nike was consequently attracted to the region, somewhat like a corporate shark lured by the smell of blood.

However, the dazzling figures above are misleading and really represent a very small minority in Indonesia, usually ethnic Chinese, Javanese businessmen, a rapidly growing middle class and military officials. GNP per capita incomes are distorted by the massive accumulation of wealth at the elite level and easily manipulated by the state. Education provides little opportunity for improved living standards to the majority of Indonesians and is too expensive to be practical. Health is also the domain of the rich. Further, measurements such as GNP or GDP are gross estimates, worked out using economic formulae, ignoring reality and according to Acciaoli (1996:2) only focus upon monetary transactions and sections of the economy which economists deem important such as the monetary market, which are far removed from other important sections of the economy such as the informal sector, the household and agriculture.

Inflation in Indonesia is very high and was officially estimated at around 10% per annum in the mid-1990s. However, these figures are officially released by a central government agency and conjecture is strong that they are manipulated. Further, essential industries in Indonesia, such as textiles, cement and plywood are heavily protected by tariffs and controlled by monopolies and oligopolies. There is an extremely rich elite running the Indonesian economy, while at the other extreme, the vast majority of Indonesian people have little or no control regarding the economy. A recent independent economic survey (1996) found that 82% of all Indonesians survive on 58,000Rp per month (US$24.00) well below the minimum needs indexes set by the state and severely contradicting state data which proudly claims that those living below the poverty line in Indonesia have fallen from 70% in 1971 to 14% in 1997. Corruption is rife in government and friends and family of president Suharto control a significant portion of the economy, while well connected Chinese Indonesians control the bulk of the rest. There is no exact way in which to measure corruption and the extent to which a small elite dominate an economy, however without doubt this elite have effectively stopped benefits of recent economic growth filtering down to the masses, most of whom continue to live in an informal economy. Any form of Trickle Down has been blocked by an elite in Indonesia who have no concern for the welfare of the population and who cannot see the danger of isolating nearly 200 million people through their massive accumulation of wealth and power.

The Indonesian government provides workers with the right to strike, form unions and bargain collectively. In reality the state making full use of its militaries dual function (social involvement) has pursued a harsh line against worker unrest and union activity. Only one union is recognised by the state, and is in fact state controlled. Known as the All Indonesian Workers Union or SPSI, this union is ineffective, rife with corruption and only represents 1.5% of the entire national workforce. Other unions have attempted to operate but their leaders usually end up in prison. Government workers are not permitted to join a union and never exercise their right to strike. The army is used to mediate in labour disputes despite a presidential decree in 1995 which claimed the military would stay out of labour disputes after criticisms from a USA trade delegation to Jakarta at the time. Indonesian law establishes a seven hour working day of 40 hours per week with one 30 minute rest period for every four hours worked. There is no national minimum wage, instead a regional minimum wage is set by regional councils each year.

Wages for Indonesian women employed in the export oriented manufacturing industry are the lowest in all of Southeast Asia and in some sectors lower than China and India. Further, according to the indices of manufacturing labour costs per hour, Indonesia had the lowest wages in the world at US$0.28c per hour in 1993 (Stewart,1994). Considering the fact that most women would be employed at wages well below the above levels, wage levels for women in Indonesia are disturbingly low. Having arguably the lowest manufacturing wages in the world, combined with a government desperate to promote industrial development with very little interest in human rights, many multi-nationals are locating in Indonesia. Further, as West Java provides the most tempting bait for investors, with its large population, strong patriarchy and a reasonably subdued culture, the interplay between culture, industrial development and women will need extensive investigation, to protect the women themselves and to make others aware of the regional situation. The voices of the women need to be heard so that the industrialisation process can be properly and progressively monitored.

Despite the above, Manning (1993,1994) claims Indonesian wages are on the increase. However, he ignores problems with the declining purchasing power of the Rupiah vis-a-vis high inflation and the relationship between total manufacturing earnings as a percentage of value added. In this regard, between 1970 and 1992 total wages indexed against value added in manufacturing declined from 26% to 19% highlighting the long term decline of minimum wages in real terms in Indonesia (World Bank,1995). Further, the index used to fix the minimum wage in Indonesia is based on wholesale prices and on a formula created by the Indonesian Ministry of Manpower which is over 40 years old. Wages are purposefully fixed at 30% below this index, keeping labour dis-empowered (KITLV,9 May,1995). Manning's data could easily be used by the Indonesian state to support its industrial policy and to appease critics. New data needs to be presented to offset what can only be termed as potential propaganda for the Indonesian elite.

According to the ILO (1993) and The Indonesian Government Collections on Labour (1994), women are provided special protection when employed in the formal labour market. Major protection's include the legal requirement that women only work a 40 hour week and are paid the minimum wage (which in 1996 was indexed to 5,200 Rp or US$2.00 per day in the major economic regions of West Java). However, in July 1995, 13,000 textile workers went on strike in West Java over the failure of a state owned textile company to meet these very basic requirements. It is interesting to note that of the 3,000 industrial disputes in West Java in the early 1990s, 74% were in the textile sector, Indonesia's most feminised industry (TJP,July19,1995). Data collected in Banjaran shows undoubtably that the protection's above are not enforced. Nike is the least likely of all factories surveyed to abide by national laws, a reflection of the enormous economic power Nike has, even to the extent to which it can influence national governments.

The ILO (1993) has documented 36 Indonesian laws which specifically protect female workers. They range from menstruation, pregnancy and lactation leave to equal rights in employment, promotion and pay and many other supportive policies. However, the ILO (1993) has found that these protection's are commonly ignored and in fact lead to further discrimination against women. Case studies from West Java have found that women work an average of 50 hours per week in factories, not including daily overtime which is compulsory depending upon orders. Moreover, those who claim maternity leave etc. are commonly laid off work. The majority of female workers are daily casuals or piecemeal workers with no real rights and when a factory does open or expand the essential criterion for employment is that new female workers have no previous factory experience (Braadbaart,1992). In Nike factories in Indonesia 60 hour weeks are common for female workers (Hildyard, et al 1996:140).

For an estimated 76 million official Indonesian workers in 1993 there were only 1,133 Labour Inspectors, 121 of whom were women. Of these inspectors, only 750 were active meaning there were 4,000 enterprises per inspector (TJP, August14,1993). These inspectors are poorly paid and many are easily distracted by the lure of bribery. Despite the fact that Average Nominal Wages for women in Indonesia in 1993 were illegally half that of male wages, and in the textile industry 81.6% of male wages, prosecutions were rare. If labour inspectors do catch a company breaching the law they are merely fined a token of 100,000 RP (US $49.00) (ILO 1993). Indonesia not only offers Nike an extreme comparative advantage in terms of low wages, it offers a female workforce used to working for wages well below the minimum level set by the state.

Banjaran is a reasonably small though densely populated administrative area in central West Java. It is inhabited by 120,000 people, most of whom are faithfully Islamic. Banjaran is isolated to the north, the east and the west by a large mountain system and to the south by a sparsely populated and extremely under-developed area. As such Banjaran has been relatively isolated and the local culture had little outside influences to contend with, until recently. Since the 1980s industrialisation and modernisation have encroached dramatically upon Banjaran. Factories are now commonplace and partially accepted, though perceived as an 'alien' part of the cultural landscape. Further, television and improved transport systems have tended to expose most people to modern influences. Nevertheless, the region in 1996 was still predominantly rural with rice production the major economic activity and the local culture, with its language, rituals and customs remaining reasonably strong.

The Nike factory in Banjaran is a Taiwanese joint venture company, and is usually called by its Taiwanese name Feng Tay by the local people. According to my research 7000 workers were employed at Feng Tay in 1996, 75% of whom were women. Feng Tay has one other shoe factory (Nike) in Jakarta and seven others worldwide, predominantly in China and South America.

Analyses of the data I collected revealed some important trends regarding Nike's employment practises (Appendix One). First, 60% of Nike workers surveyed had very low education levels, only SD (Primary School). By comparison, 48% of the women surveyed from 'all other factories' had completed SMP (Secondary Education) and another 18% had completed SMA (Senior High School). By contrast, only 33% and 7% of Nike workers, respectively, had completed SMP and SMA. Therefore, 60% of the Nike women surveyed had only 6 years education (SD), while 66% of all other women surveyed had between 9 and 12 years education (SMP or SMA). Second, the youngest cohort of women sampled came from Nike. The average age of Nike workers was 16 years of age, (the youngest was 11 years old when she entered the factory) and 41% of those surveyed were only 15 years of age or younger when they first entered the Nike factory. On the other hand, the average age of women surveyed from 'all other factories' was 18 years of age and only 15% of these entered the factory at the age of 15 years or less.

Third, women who work for Nike are generally found in clusters in villages around Banjaran, and usually in the more isolated villages where other work is extremely scarce (Appendix Two). More recently, extremely high population densities in the region combined with massive unemployment among young men and severe land shortages has left young women very few choices in life. The isolation of the villages is directly associated with low education levels, as distance increases from Central Banjaran education levels of women fall dramatically. Fourth, and in complete contradiction to Nike's propaganda (p2) the average employment span of the female Nike workers surveyed was only 1.7 years compared to an average of 3.6 years for the entire cohort of women sampled (Appendix Three).

Low education, low employment age, a lack of alternative employment and short employment spans, combined with isolation are all factors which enhance Nike's ability to exploit workers. Nike's exploitation of workers is no better represented by the shorter working life of its' female employees, which is almost half that of all women sampled. A shorter working life is a strong indication that serious problems exist in the Nike factory.

Overt resistance to Feng Tay is a luxury the workers cannot afford. In Indonesia public resistance usually leads to trouble from authority (police, military and all levels of government) and loss of jobs. Worse, it could result in Black Listing (Appendix Four) or even murder (Marsinah). In spite of these constraints, in October 1996 a group of workers at Feng Tay refused food for three days and worked without eating as they are not allowed out of the factory gates to buy food. For three days a group of young women worked 12 hour shifts without food in protest of their working conditions. This resistance was not reported in the media, however it was common knowledge in the Banjaran community. The hunger strike had no immediate impact on working conditions at Feng Tay. Nevertheless, the fact that a group of young women were prepared to 'fight back' is an indication of the changing social and economic roles of young women in the region, especially considering that these same women are traditionally restricted from public protest.

In Banjaran the majority of export-oriented factories treat their female employees in accordance with national laws related to wages and working conditions. However, only one of the 20 factories studied paid the women all their wage, benefits and leave requirements. Most factories granted some allowances and ignored others. Nevertheless, most of the women interviewed from these factories, including their parents or husbands, were generally happy with their employment conditions. Many of the factories provide time to allow the women to pray two times a day, and if the women worked over-time an extra praying session was allowed. The large majority of women stated that their daily targets were not stressful and if they did encounter difficulties in meeting their targets, their supervisors were supportive and rarely abusive. However, all the Feng Tay workers interviewed revealed differing levels of harsh treatment combined with very stressful daily targets. Furthermore, Feng Tay does not pay Menstrual Leave, Sick Leave, Maternity Leave, Holiday Pay, Food or Transport Allowances and rarely pays Bonuses, all of which are stipulation's of the Indonesian National Labour Laws (Table Three).

Many factories provided free transportation where practicable (Table Three). However, due to the mountainous terrain and poor subsidiary roads, factory buses usually only operate on major roads, forcing many women to walk long distances at night when other local forms of transport have ceased to operate. Nike provides no transportation allowance. Nor is the factory compassionate toward the transportation difficulties faced by many of its' workers due to the combination of the factory's long shifts and the difficult terrain they must traverse, usually in the dark.

I interviewed a young man who had worked as a supervisor at Feng Tay for five months in 1995. He left the job because he said he could no longer live with his conscience. He stated that he was shocked during his training as a Nike supervisor due to the new skills he was expected to learn; skills to control women, which usually translated to verbal abuse, such as Fuck You and move you stupid bitch to be used indiscriminately on the workers. Another skill he was taught was to make the women run. At Feng Tay supervisors must ensure the women run; they must run to the toilet, run to the lunch room and basically run everywhere they go, even when they are not actually working. He stated that he left the factory because it insulted his culture and his religion, mainly because he was taught to respect women, a fact the Taiwanese do not understand. Finally, he stated that at Feng Tay it is usual for 100 women to enter as new workers and soon after (usually when the three month training period ends) for 50 to leave. During the three month training period daily wages are extremely low.

Quotes from the Nike supervisors journal reveal the distress he felt whilst working for Nike;

    I can't stop wishing to leave from this hell, I think They

    (the Taiwanese management) do not understand modern

    managerial skills at all. They know their position is very

    important to Indonesia and can do what they please; so we

    just wait and see, but big trouble will come to this factory,

    the management is evil. I hope Allah has a better place for

    the women who work here (Budi Kurniawan,1995).

A similar situation exists in Nike factories in China, where the Taiwanese management dominate workers to the point of cruelty (Chan,1996:1). To add to Chan's comments is a recent report released by Community Aid Abroad (Australia) which stated that sports shoe manufacturers in Asia have a similar pattern of poor working conditions, overwork, underpay, rejection of collective bargaining and refusal to supply health benefits, combined with the physical abuse of workers (CAA,1996). These companies claim innocence because it is not their responsibility to support workers or interfere with their sub-contractors. However, when Nike came to Banjaran to view Kukje as a potential new factory in 1996, Nike enforced massive change in administration and production procedures but did not mention ensuring workers rights or working conditions.

Many other factories in Banjaran pay low three month training wages, however the women in these factories are more likely to continue working for many years after. At Feng Tay costs are cut by harsh practises which force many women to leave before or soon after their three month training period is completed. Despite the existence of an Indonesian national law on Minimum Wages, I found one women who had worked for six months at Nike and was only receiving 3,700 RP per day, which is well below the legal regional wage of 5,200 RP per day. She could not explain why, except to say that because she, unlike most of her friends, didn't work seven days a week, she was not entitled to the legal daily wage. Another worker interviewed had previously worked at Feng Tay for 2 years when a serious knee injury forced the worker to leave. No health insurance or sick pay was renumerated. Further, no compensation for a permanent disability was forthcoming from Feng Tay.

In the majority of factories in Banjaran long hours of overtime are rarely compulsory. However, when overtime was needed it was usually welcomed by the women as a source of extra money. Nevertheless, most factories demanded compulsory night work after 11.00 PM despite national laws which pretend to regulate such practises. The women I interviewed had no real complaints about night work (apart from tiredness) and also claimed it allowed them to earn extra income. Nike forces extreme overtime conditions, usually seven days a week, which places its' workers in a permanent state of exhaustion. This suits Feng Tay because exhausted workers do not have the strength to resist. However, high staff turnover and exhausted workers must surely translate into lower productivity for Feng Tay.

At Feng Tay, as in most large factories in Banjaran and in the region, young female workers are channelled into the most demanding sections of production. In the case of shoe factories this is the stitching section, where high pressure, long working hours, forced overtime and very few holidays are common. Staff turnover rates in these sections are very high. At Feng Tay, 1000 people work in the stitching section, 90% are young unmarried women under 25 years of age. They receive no religious holiday leave (Lebaran) as do women from other factories in Banjaran and they are lucky if they get two days holiday per month. It is in sections such as stitching that young women are most vulnerable to exploitation, usually because they are young, relatively uneducated, usually unmarried and with very little experience in dealing with authority and almost no knowledge of their rights. From a cultural perspective young unmarried women must refrain from protest and anger and are forbidden to 'stand up' to male authority. Most of the women I spoke with took this tradition very seriously. Women in Banjaran are therefore inclined to accept the harsh conditions at Feng Tay, without public complaint.

In September 1996 I interviewed a Lurah or Kepala Desa (Village Head) from one of the 17 Desa (or small administrative regions) which make up the district of Banjaran. The Lurah is a quasi-democratically elected head of about 7,000 people and is essentially the last link between the national and regional governments and the village. I asked the Lurah what he thought about Feng Tay and the resulting reply confirmed my findings. He stated that Feng Tay was different from all other foreign factories in Banjaran, explaining it was more like a 'prison' and the Lurah knew personally of many women who had left the factory soon after starting work there. He also stated that it was common for community leaders to try and discourage women from entering work at this factory. However, because there is little alternative work for women in some areas of Banjaran, and the need for work more desperate in some households, women were forced to accept employment at Feng Tay.

I asked for an example of why Feng Tay was exploitative. The Lurah told me of a recent death of a young women at the factory. The woman collapsed at 12.00 midday in the factory from heat exhaustion. She was not taken to the factory medical-clinic, but to the Mosque where she lay unconscious for many hours. Later when she had not regained consciousness she was taken to hospital where she died soon after. No one knows why she died, and there was no investigation or compensation from Feng Tay. However, in the opinion of the Banjaran community the women died of exhaustion and lack of medical treatment (neglect). The death of this women is the result of criminal neglect associated with the sick leave arrangements developed by Feng Tay. One must wonder about the rationale of taking an unconscious women to a Mosque, and not to the medical-clinic, simply to deter others' from taking sick leave. If the young women had been taken to the medical-clinic her chances of survival would have been greatly increased.

At Feng Tay if women are sick they must report to work, no matter how serious their illness. If they stay at home and rest, even with the permission of a doctor's certificate (in accordance with national laws), they are instantly dismissed upon returning to work (I know personally of three women who suffered this fate, they all stated they were too sick to walk the long distance to Central Banjaran, and all had certificates from doctors). The sick leave arrangements at Feng Tay are unusually cruel. If women become ill at work they must stay in the Mosque until their shift is finished and then they may return home. If they are still sick the next day they must report to work as usual and stay all day in the Mosque. If women become ill at home the same rule applies, they must report to work and stay in the Mosque, not in the medical-clinic (the cost of which is deducted monthly from all employees' wages). Women who live in the more isolated villages (some up to two hours walk away) must show up for work or they will be dismissed. Further, the constant rain during one half of the year means that sick women are forced to walk in the rain and in dangerous terrain merely to sit in the Mosque. This practice has been developed by Feng Tay to deter women from taking sick leave and is indicative, not only of the managements' attitude towards the welfare of its' employees, but also of Nike's complete disregard for workers who come under its' sphere of influence.

In October 1996 the large shoe factory next door to Feng Tay, a Korean owned factory called Kukje employing 5000 workers, (80% are women), started to produce Nike shoes. For a small city 9 hours by road from the port at Jakarta, one must wonder why Nike has granted two contracts in the area. One reason is that Kukje were initially filling Nike orders directly from Feng Tay due to the factory's inability to meet all of it's export orders. Further, Nike is expecting to have a record year in 1997 with annual revenue projected to go well over the US$4 billion mark (CAA,1996). Moreover, in Banjaran Nike can avoid the industrial unrest common in Jakarta and also avoid the media 'spotlight' as the company has come under a lot of international pressure recently. Despite promises from Nike that it will improve the conditions of its' workers, recent evidence from Kukje indicates that Nike has no interest whatsoever in the welfare of workers who are unfortunate enough to have to produce Nike shoes.

I visited the Kukje factory before the introduction of Nike shoes and talked with management, supervisors and workers. The factory had a very congenial atmosphere. The women said the existing daily target system was not stressful. The Korean management said it was crucial to keep the women happy and the supervisors seemed to have very good relations with the women ( I watched them for a long time without their knowledge). However, five weeks after Nike had been introduced at Kukje I interviewed two workers in their homes. Later these interviews were consolidated by interviews with four other workers from Kukje. The impact of the change to Nike-style production had been drastic, (according to the women). They were noticeably exhausted and stated that they were not coping with the new pressure. Their Sunday holiday had been temporarily cancelled and compulsory overtime was becoming increasingly common. Further, the annual three day holiday during the Christmas period was cancelled at Kukje for the first time since the factory began production.

Moreover, their normal daily production quota of 200 pairs of shoes a day had been increased to 300 for Nike. The women also claimed they were no longer free to go to the toilet, but must sign a leave slip before they go. One worker said she tried to 'hold on' all day because she did not want her name in the book as she would be ashamed (malu). Finally, the women claimed their praying time had been cut short and now when they prayed a supervisor watched them and made them hurry. The women also stated their supervisors were becoming increasingly angry toward them, and were abusive because the women were not working fast enough, making most women scared and nervous (In December, one young worker came to my house with her parents because she thought she was going to lose her job as her Korean supervisor had screamed at her because she was not working fast enough. Previously, before the introduction of Nike at Kukje this same girl had told me she loved her supervisor because he was very understanding. The young women was extremely worried about facing the supervisor the next day as she blamed herself for the trouble). After a few months the production of Nike shoes has had a serious impact on thousands of workers at Kukje. The women I interviewed were obviously distressed by the change and confused by the sudden transformation in the attitude of their supervisors.

If Kukje continues to follow Feng Tay's lead in a quest to keep Nike profitable then the impact will inevitably become more harsh in the future and will directly effect the workers and their families. As one Lurah said to me people need two things from their job, and both are as important as each other. He said that they needed enough money to survive and also needed a compassionate workplace (as do all workers). I would argue that Nike is not only denying both, but also corrupting existing standards of working relations in other large factories in the Banjaran region. Nike is a threat to the community in Banjaran.

Feng Tay is the negative result of the combination of international and Indonesian capital (Taiwan and Chinese/Indonesian) a Western corporation (Nike) and a developing countries desire to industrialise quickly (Indonesia). Local leaders in Banjaran are powerless to resist the potent tri-partite combination mentioned above and higher level government officials are either not willing or not able to act against firms like Feng Tay and Nike. The economic situation at the local and regional level in West Java is such that international capital is now heavily relied upon to create employment. The more jobs international corporations generate in areas like Banjaran, the more power they have to dictate terms and create their own culture of labour relations.

Economic development via industrialisation has been pursued at all costs in Indonesia. The resulting human suffering is irrelevant to the powers that be. Trickle Down is not a reality to the Indonesian people, greed, corruption, oppression and exploitation are, however. Claims that poverty has declined rapidly since the 1970s as a result of industrial development are questionable. Since independence, labour Laws have been passed in Indonesia with regular monotony, designed to protect workers, they do very little. Most laws are easily avoided by international companies such as Nike. In reality countries like Taiwan and Korea are allowed to import the worst aspects of their labour relations into poorer nations such as Indonesia, unimpeded. Feng Tay's sick leave arrangements are a prime example of this. In the developing world international factories like Feng Tay and corporation like Nike function independently and are more like self contained Industrial Embassies, immune from both local and national labour standards and are a 'law unto themselves'.

Many people made it clear they were extremely scared after speaking with me about Feng Tay. They were concerned about possible reprisals from the factory and from local military authorities, who commonly intervene in industrial disputes, usually at the request of the factory management. All were assured confidentiality and traceable records were completely disguised and later destroyed before I left the region. The only remaining record is this paper which is non-threatening to the respondents. I am grateful to the many people who shared their knowledge with me despite the obvious risks. I hope this paper adds to the cause of improving the conditions and status of female factories workers in the poorer parts of the world and more specifically, I hope this paper draws more international attention to Nike and to Feng Tay.

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1. The data from Nike was analysed and compared to the data from all other surveys. The findings revealed serious differences in the nature of the female workforce at Feng Tay (42 Nike women were surveyed from an overall 323 women).

2. Traditionally, agricultural work is not available to young Banjaran women, due to strong cultural and religious norms which have inhibited young women from employment creating literally millions of 'servants to the household'.

3. N.B these figures are slightly skewed because women who had worked in a factory for less than six months were not eligible for the survey.

4. Once Blacklisted a person cannot get a letter of clearance (Surat Keterangan Berkelakuan Baik) from the Police Station, which essentially means they cannot re-enter the formal economy again.