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Monitoring the Monitors: A Critique of PricewaterhouseCooper's
Labor Monitoring
The full report can be found here
on our website: 41kb
pdf)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report presents the first systematic public analysis of the
monitoring methods employed by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) to inspect
factory labor practices around the world. The author accompanied PwC
auditors on factory inspections in China and Korea, and evaluated
PwCs findings for a factory in Indonesia. In these inspections,
PwC auditors found minor violations of labor laws and codes of conduct.
However, the auditors missed major labor practice issues. Auditors
failed to note:
- Hazardous chemical use and other serious health and safety problems;
- Barriers to freedom of association and collective bargaining;
- Violations of overtime laws;
- Violations of wage laws;
- Timecards that appeared to be falsified.
These omissions are due to problems in PwCs monitoring methods.
PwC auditors gathered information primarily from managers rather
than workers, depending largely on data provided by management.
Worker interviews were problematic. All interviews were conducted
inside the factories. PwC auditors had managers help them select
workers to be interviewed, had the managers collect their personnel
files, and had them bring the workers into the office for the interviews.
The managers knew who was being interviewed, for how long, and on
what issues. PwC auditors conducted very limited inspections of
health and safety conditions in the factories. The auditors failed
to note a number of critical workplace health issues. The factory
inspection reports PwC produced did not convey an accurate picture
of the conditions in these factories.
The reports are so condensed that they miss major issues and paint
a false impression of a factorys compliance with local laws.
This analysis shows that PwCs monitoring methods are significantly
flawed. Universities and firms interested in auditing labor conditions
in the factories producing their goods should consider other monitoring
methods and should demand improvements in current monitoring schemes.
Independent monitoring can play a positive role in improving factory
conditions, but only if it is much more transparent and accountable,
includes workers more fully, and can be verified by local NGOs and
workers themselves.
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